Rufat Ahmadzada

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Aug 11 2025

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The authorities in Cyprusarrested a British national of Azerbaijani descenton 21 June on suspicion of spying and terror related activities. This is the latest example of the Iranian regimes use of Azerbaijani community members abroad for IRGC-Quds force extraterritorial operations. According to Cypriot media reports, the suspect is thought to have beenspying on a British RAF military base in nearby Akrotiri. It is also claimed thatthe arrested individual was about to carry out an act of terrorism. On the same day,Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar revealed that an Iranian terror plot had been thwarted in Cyprus, thanks to the close cooperation of the local authorities with Israeli security services, and accused the Iranian regime of trying to target Israeli nationals in Cyprus. It is not clear whether the case is related to the arrest of the British national of Azerbaijani descent, however, asThe Telegraph claims it was a separate incident.

Just two days later, on 23 June,an Azerbaijani man with Polish citizenship was arrested on the Greek island of Crete on suspicion of espionage. It is reported that the suspect had takenthousands of photos of military installations and warshipson the island, which hosts the United States Souda Bay naval base. These two cases reveal the IRGC-Quds forces increasing use of foreign nationals of Azerbaijani descent in its clandestine operations abroad. This would appear to be a deliberate policy by Tehran with the dual aims of conducting extraterritorial operations and tarnishing the reputation of Azerbaijani people around the world.

Moreover, Iranian intelligence services have been actively involved in recruiting members of the Azerbaijani community in countries like Georgia and Russia over the years. It is noteworthy that Iran has increased its soft power among the Georgian Azerbaijani community in particular with the tacit approval of successive Georgian governments, while it has done the same among the Azerbaijani community in Russia. One of the most prominent cases revealing both Irans close cooperation with organized crime and its use of gangsters of Azerbaijani descent was the plot to kill American Iranian dissident and journalist Masih Alinejad.

In July 2022, Khalid Mehdiyev, 27, a self-proclaimed member of the Russian mob, was on a mission to assassinate the prominent Iranian-American journalist Masih Alinejad. He told a New York court in March this year thathe had been hired for 30,000 US dollars by Rafat Amirov and Polad Omarov. They in turn had been tasked by IRGC operatives to carry out the killing for 500,000 US dollars. Polad Omarov was arrested in the Czech Republic in 2023 and wasextradited to the United States to face charges in the Alinejad casein February 2024.Rafat Amirov was also arrested and extradited to the USAto stand trial. Khalid Mehdiyev said at the hearing that Rafat Amirov had told himthe Iranian regime was behind the plot.

Khalid Mehdiyev arrived in the United States in November 2017 and claimed political asylum, arguing that he would be tortured in Azerbaijan, where he was in fact wanted for his criminal activities.A member of the Azerbaijani judo team who dropped out for a life of crime, Khalid Mehdiyev was the perfect hitman for Irans Quds force to carry out the assassination attempt on Masih Alinejad. TheUS Justice Department officially accused Georgian national Polad Omarov and Iranian national Rafat Amirov(both ethnic Azerbaijanis) of involvement in the plot to assassinate Masih Alinejad on behalf of Iran. Mehdiyev, Omarov and Amirov wereall members of the crime syndicate of infamous Georgian Azerbaijani mobster Nadir Salifov, known in criminal circles as Lotu Guli.Polad Omarov was recruited by Nadir Salifov in 2014.

Salifov was considered a top crime boss in Azerbaijan, Russia and Turkey, and waskilled by his bodyguard in Turkeyin 2020.An ethnic Azerbaijani born in Georgia and a Georgian citizen, Salifov recruited mainly Georgian-born Azerbaijanis to his syndicate. Before being assigned the job of murdering Masih Alinejad,Khalid Mehdiyev had been involved in extorting money from an ethnic Azerbaijani grocery store ownerin Brooklyn. Polad Omarovs co-defendant Rafat Amirov was residing in Iran and is shown as an Iranian citizen in the US official indictments, but also holds Azerbaijani and Russian citizenship.

In January 2025,Azerbaijans State Security Service announced the arrest of two individuals who planned to kill a prominent figure in Azerbaijans Jewish community. Later, The Washington Post revealed that a Georgian citizen and drug trafficker namedAgil Aslanov had been hired by Irans Quds force to organise and carry out the killing of Rabbi Shneor Segalfor 200,000 US dollars. The foiledplot was also intended to target a Jewish education centrein Baku, according to media reports. Agil Aslanov, whose name implies that he is from Georgias ethnic Azerbaijani community, is another example of the Quds forces use of Georgian citizens with an Azerbaijani background in terror plots abroad. It is evident that Irans soft power in Georgias ethnic Azerbaijani regions as well as its ties with Georgian Azerbaijani criminal elements pose an increasing security risk to Azerbaijan.

Successive Georgian governments allowed the rise of Iranian soft power among the local Azerbaijani community with the aim of balancing the influence of the Republic of Azerbaijan and keeping the local community inactive in domestic governance. The Azerbaijani community constitutes the second largest ethnic group in Georgia, numbering more than 250,000 people or 6.5% of the countrys population.The Iranian regime uses its humanitarian charities and businesses to spread its ideology among the Georgian Azerbaijani communityand thereby weaken Azerbaijans influence. The Iran-linked Ahlibeyt Cultural-Educational Society located in Marneuli, an ethnically Azerbaijani dominated town in eastern Georgia, receives finance and support from Iran via the Iranian embassy. TheAhlibeyt.ge website published in the Azerbaijani language promotes the Iranian regimes ideological and political interestsas well as narratives advancing Irans soft power over the Georgian Azerbaijani community.

In 2021, a Russian citizen of Azerbaijani descent,Orkhan Asadov, was arrested in Cyprus accused of trying to carry out a terrorist attack against Israelisliving on the island. Orkhan Asadov is thought to have been paid 40,000 USD to carry out the terror attack by Irans IRGC Quds force. What makes Asadovs case different from the actions of Lotu Gulis criminal syndicate and the Georgian drug traffickers case is the religious ideological link to the Islamic Republic. As part of the crackdown on Iranian sleeper cells in 2022, Azerbaijans State Security Service (DTX) exposed an Iran-linked armed network whose members had been recruited and trained in Syria under Iranian supervision.Azerbaijans intelligence service named Orkhan Asadov as the key individualin recruiting members of the group.Yunis Safarov, a Russian citizen of Azerbaijani descent who tried to kill the former mayor of the Azerbaijani city of Ganjain 2018, had also been recruited by Iran in Russia. Safarov had lived in Qom in Iran for eight months in 2016 before travelling to Syria andjoining Iran-backed Shia militias in targeting Syrian opposition members.

Irans Quds force operatives continue to operate freely in Russia with the tacit approval of the Russian state, particularly in recruiting ethnic Talish community members to work against Azerbaijan and in carrying out missions such as Asadovs.The Moscow Islamic Centre, funded and created by Iran in 2012, was led by an Iranian citizen, Hojjat al Islam Saber Akbari Jiddibetween 2013 and 2023. There are reports that Akbari Jiddi was the representative of Irans Supreme Leader in Russia. Another important Iran-funded organisation is the Huseyniyya, led by Qom-educated Russian citizen and ethnic Talish Famil Jafarov. He is considered to be a close associate of Hojjat al Islam Saber Akbari Jiddi andis known for his activism in defence of the Iran-backed radical Islamists arrested in Azerbaijan.Russia is known to harbour Talish separatists who work closely with Iran against Azerbaijan. The Russian authorities prefer to see Iran working among the Azerbaijani community rather than the Republic of Azerbaijan, as pro-Iranian people will be hostile towards the Republic. This aligns with Moscows foreign policy, which often coincides with Iranian interests.

Overall, it is evident that the Iranian regime has been actively using foreign nationals of Azerbaijani descent to conduct espionage and terror attacks. The IRGC Quds force works with two distinct groups to carry out its operations: crime syndicates and the religiously indoctrinated, ideologically committed individuals mostly among the Azerbaijani community in Georgia and Russia. This in turn shows that Tehran conducts soft power policies to target and recruit members of Azerbaijani communities. This needs to be addressed by Baku. In particular, Azerbaijan should get tough on Georgia to curb Iranian activities in the ethnic Azerbaijani regions of Georgia, as these activities pose a security threat to Azerbaijan.

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• Opinion For Lasting Peace Armenia Needs to Remove Territorial Claims From Its Constitution

About The Author(s)

Rufat Ahmadzadais a PhD candidate in Politics and graduate of City, University of London. His research covers Azerbaijan, Iran and the South Caucasus region.

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